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The FEHB Program
The Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB)
program frequently enters health policy discussions. It is
often cited as a living example of “managed competition,”
in which a multitude of health plans compete for customers. Some analysts have held it up as a model for Medicare and other public programs to emulate. Some legislators view it as a vehicle upon which to piggyback coverage of other populations, such as military retirees or
employees of small businesses. Last, but not least, the
FEHB program is simply a major purchaser of health
insurance. In fact, it is the largest employer health plan in
the United States, providing coverage to about 9 million
people—federal workers and retirees and their dependents and survivors—at an annual cost of about $17 billion.
This Forum meeting will examine how the federal
employees health program works, what issues its
managers face, and what lessons their experience might
offer for covering other populations.

HISTORY
Congress did not set out to design a health insurance
marketplace when it created the FEHB program in
1959. Rather, it was doing something that most other
large employers already had accomplished in simply
providing health benefits for employees.
The program began operation in 1960, offering 28
plans, with 15 available in the Washington, D.C., area.1
The enabling legislation enacting the FEHB program
allowed four types of plans to compete: existing
employee-sponsored plans, a nationwide service benefit
plan, a nationwide indemnity plan, and health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Previously, in the absence
of an employer-sponsored plan, some federal government agencies had offered group plans paid for by
employees. The legislation allowed those employee
organization plans to continue. Under the provisions of
the statute authorizing the Civil Service Commission to
contract for a government-wide service benefit plan and
a government-wide indemnity plan, Blue Cross and Blue
Shield and the Aetna Life Insurance Company, respectively, established plans in the program. Each had a high
and a standard option.2 (Aetna withdrew its indemnity
plan several years ago, after its competitive position was
damaged by adverse risk selection.) The original law
also required the program to offer HMOs, and at the
beginning 21 participated. Today, the number of HMOs
has grown to more than 300. While the fee-for-service

plans in the FEHB program are limited to those specified
in statute, the law allows any HMO to join if it meets
federal admission requirements. Seven of the fee-forservice plans are open only to people in select groups.

A MARKETPLACE
The FEHB program is often called the largest
managed competition system for offering consumers a
large variety of health plan choices in a way that contains costs.3 Over its almost 40-year history, the program
has faced several problems, some directly related to the
large number of options offered to members. One of the
most significant problems is related to risk segmentation—that is, some health plans in the program have
attracted or retained a disproportionate number of older
and sicker people than others. Attracting a relatively
sicker population means that plans must charge higher
prices, thereby putting them at a competitive disadvantage compared to plans with healthier enrollees.
Two key architectural features driving competition
within the FEHB program are its annual open enrollment period and its method for contributing to members’ health plan costs. In essence, each year the government offers each employee or retiree a sum of
money to help cover the cost of health coverage, while
asking the person to contribute part of his or her wages
or pension toward that cost. About 15 percent of those
eligible eschew the program altogether. Some of these
people opt to join outside plans, such as those offered
by spouses’ employers that may have richer benefits or
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require a lower employee contribution. Others (probably mostly younger people or low-wage workers) opt to
have no health insurance.4 FEHB program members can
choose from between one and three dozen plans in each
geographic area.5 In 1996, while the vast majority of
plans being offered were HMOs, 72 percent of those
covered by the program chose fee-for-service or PPO
(preferred provider organization) plans.6 Almost all of
the 2.3 million active employees in the program have
chosen either HMOs with limited networks of providers
or PPOs in which they face financial incentives to use
providers in a network. About 5 percent of enrollees
switch among plans each year.
Of the 4.1 million employees and annuitants in the
program, about 1.8 million were enrolled in the Blue
Cross/Blue Shield high and low options, as of September 1997. Other fee-for-service plans with the highest
number of enrollees were the Mail Handlers high and
low options (479,000), Government Employees Hospital
Association (246,000), National Association of Letter
Carriers (166,000), and American Postal Workers Union
(115,000). HMOs with the largest FEHB enrollment
were Kaiser Permanente-California (139,000), Aetna
U.S. Healthcare (92,000), Kaiser Permanente MidAtlantic (77,000), NYLCare Mid-Atlantic (41,000), and
GHI Health Plan (41,000). About 80 HMOs in the
program had fewer than 300 FEHB enrollees. (PruCare
of Connecticut had only two FEHB members as of
September 1997.)7
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM),
which runs the program, sets financial, administrative,
and benefit terms for each plan. While each plan must
offer core medical and hospital benefits, there is
considerable variety in benefit structures. OPM publishes a guide to help members makes choices but does
not attempt to compare the costs of plans for members.
The agency also provides extensive information on the
OPM Web page on the Internet. At least half of the
covered employees and many retirees have access to
and use the Web site, according to OPM officials.8 The
Center for the Study of Services, publisher of Washington Consumers’ CHECKBOOK magazine, sells a
consumer guide for $8.95 that estimates how much
each plan will cost enrollees by subtracting the government contribution from each plan’s premium and
adding to that amount estimates of how much each plan
will cost people as a result of cost-sharing features,
such as copayments and deductibles.

The FEHB Program’s Payments to Plans
OPM pays health plans under a formula that will
change January 1, 1999, under provisions in the Bal-

anced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). In 1996, the federal
contribution ranged from about $1,100 to $1,600,
constituting 75 percent of the least expensive plan’s
premium and 47 percent of the costliest plan’s
premium.9 Federal employees and retirees pick up the
rest of the tab.
Originally designed to cover 60 percent of premium
costs, the federal contribution was set at 60 percent of
the average of six plans that Congress thought would be
representative of the entire program’s population. These
“Big Six” plans were specified as the high options
under the service benefit and indemnity benefits plans,
the two largest employee organization plans, and the
two largest HMOs. Over the years, the high-option
plans experienced substantial adverse selection, partly
because they tended to retain a higher-utilizing population, causing their premiums to rise faster than those of
other plans. Linking the government contribution to the
premium growth rates of plans that experienced adverse
segmentation resulted in the government's spending
more than it intended on almost every other plan in the
program.
When Aetna withdrew its government-wide indemnity plan from the program in 1990 because the plan’s
viability was being threatened by adverse risk segmentation, the government contribution would have
dropped considerably if it had been based on the
remaining five of the “Big Six” plans enumerated in
statute. Instead, a contribution methodology was
enacted that preserved the “Big Six” formula by calculating a “phantom” Aetna premium based on the actual
1989 premium raised by the average premium increase
for the other five plans. The phantom formula was
extended through the end of contract year 1996 and a
slightly modified version was used for 1997 and 1998.
Since the phantom premium is substantially higher than
the other five premiums, it artificially inflated the
government’s contribution, according to OPM. (The
1997 and 1998 modifications were intended to alleviate
this problem.)
Barring further amendments of the law, the program
would have shifted to a “Big Five” formula to set the
government premium contributions after 1998, resulting
in the shift of nearly $27 a month in costs to the average
enrollee. Instead, the administration and Congress
developed a new “fair share” formula that was enacted
as part of the BBA. Beginning in 1999, this formula
will set the government’s maximum dollar contribution
at 72 percent of the weighted average premium of
program participants; it will continue the 75 percent
ceiling on the contribution to any particular plan.
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The current FEHB payment formula encourages but
may not maximize competitive premium prices. Setting
the government contribution on a percentage basis
limits how much consumers will respond. For example,
program members who shift among the lower-cost plans
keep only 25 percent of the premium savings and must
pay only 25 percent of any additional premium. However, those who shift among the highest-cost plans will
pay the full marginal cost of any additional premium
because of the government contribution ceiling. Finally,
price competition based on plan efficiency may be
muted because the government does not adjust payment
to health plans to compensate those that have attracted
or retained higher-risk members.
A payment formula that would send stronger price
signals to consumers would have the government pay a
fixed amount equal to the entire premium of the least
costly plan, with members picking up the additional
costs if they opted for other plans. In the absence of a
risk-adjusted payment formula, however, stronger price
signals might exacerbate the risk segmentation that
already has occurred and cause many of the remaining
fee-service-plans to become uncompetitive. OPM
officials interviewed say that they believe on philosophical grounds that all employees ought to contribute
something toward paying for premiums. Furthermore,
moving to a contribution formula that required employees to pay nothing for the cheapest plan might raise
costs to the government if it induced people who have
opted for spouses’ plans with greater contribution
requirements to shift into the FEHB program.
OPM officials also say that they do not want employees’ choice of plan to be based entirely on price and
want people to consider the quality of plans as well. To
this end, the agency surveys members’ satisfaction with
plans and publishes the findings and is working to
develop quality measures.

Risk Segmentation
The FEHB program enrolls three sets of people:
employees, annuitants with Medicare, and annuitants
without Medicare, according to Walton Francis, a longtime analyst of the program. In total, more than 40
percent of those enrolled in the program are annuitants.
Annuitants with Medicare cost the program slightly less
than employees, because Medicare is primary payer for
their coverage. The remaining annuitants are more
costly to insure. Over the years, employees and annuitants with Medicare gradually fled plans with a disproportionate share of annuitants without Medicare,
causing a number of plans to enter “a death spiral from

adverse selection.”10 According to Francis, the main
reform needed to offset the effects of risk segmentation
is to have the government pay more for higher-cost
annuitants.
Risk segmentation has had negative economic
consequences for many of the FEHB program’s members. A plan that has attracted primarily high health
risks can cost several times as much for approximately
the same level of benefits as a plan made up of healthier
risks. For example, an evaluation of the FEHB program
published by OPM in 1988 documented that, while
Aetna’s high and standard options had virtually the
same actuarial value (a three-percentage-point difference was estimated), the high-option premium was
more than two times greater and its employee contribution rate was more than four times higher than the
corresponding figures for the standard option.11 OPM
officials say that risk segmentation is a much smaller
problem in the program today than it was a decade ago.
They point out that it does not have any impact on
government costs and that individuals have freedom to
leave a plan they think is overpriced and join another.
However, many employees do not understand the cost
and benefit differences between plans, despite the
information available to them.
The 1988 evaluation by Towers, Perrin, Forster, &
Crosby concluded that the FEHB program faced several
fundamental problems. It noted that, while plans
competed at the consumer level for lower-risk enrollees,
the lack of competition among carriers for entry into the
program had severe consequences. As noted above,
OPM can exercise little or no discretion about which
firms compete. The nationwide plans are determined by
statute, and any HMO may join that meets certain
standards. According to the report:
By legislating that it will do business with certain
entities and only with those entities, the Government
relinquishes the tremendous leverage it could other
exercise in the health care marketplace. By contracting
with such a large number of entities (over 400), the
Government also multiplies its costs and fragments its
buying power. Competition in the FEHB program is
at the consumer level, for which the program has
often been praised. However, this form of competition
does nothing to counteract these inefficiencies, but
actually exacerbates them. As noted above, the purpose of this competition is almost exclusively to
attract the better risks, not to provide a product in the
most cost-effective manner.12

The 1988 evaluation also noted that communityrated HMOs, often drawing healthier members of the
federal employee program, might be overpaid. To
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alleviate this problem, OPM now negotiates rates with
HMOs based either on the experience of FEHB members or on an estimation of what private firms are
paying. This estimate is based on rates paid by the two
employers in the community whose numbers of employees enrolled in the HMO are closest in size to the
number from the FEHB program.
In recent years, OPM has taken a number of steps to
mitigate the opportunities for risk selection. The program’s administrators have limited the variation in
benefit packages, requiring some plans to drop benefits
and others to add them. The difference in actuarial
value of the packages is reported to have narrowed to as
little as about 10 percent, down from four or five times
that much in 1989.13 Despite the narrowing of actuarial
value, the costs to employees among plans can vary
widely. For example, the enrollees’ share of premium
for fee-for-service plans ranges from $39.55 a month to
$248.41 a month. While some of the difference is
attributable to benefit differences, how much of the cost
variation is due to risk segmentation, plan efficiency,
quality of care, and other factors is open to question.

Costs
In recent years, the FEHB program has held up well
when compared to other employer programs in its effort
to restrain the growth of health insurance premiums.
Surveys of employers show that annual premium growth
in employer plans dropped from double-digit rates at the
beginning of the decade to 2 percent or less during the
past three years.14 While demonstrating a similar trend,
FEHB premiums have generally grown at rates lower
than those reported by nonfederal employers, with
average premiums actually declining in 1995 and 1996,
according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
Although OPM announced that FEHB premiums would
increase by an average of 8.5 percent in 1998, this
appears to be consistent with developments in the
private market, according to CBO. Premium increases
among private employers will be in the 5 to 10 percent
range in 1998, according to estimates by the Hay Group,
a firm that tracks employer premium costs.

proposals would open the program to military retirees
and to members of the general public who do not have
access to health insurance.
A bill introduced recently by Reps. Bill Archer (RTex.) and Dan Burton (R-Ind.) would allow federal
workers to opt for high-deductible policies coupled with
medical savings accounts (MSAs). Proposals to establish MSAs as an option in Medicare and the private
sector drew opposition from those arguing that the highdeductible policies would exacerbate risk segmentation
problems because they would appeal mainly to relatively younger, healthier people. Proponents often argue
that the high-deductible policy provides a helpful
incentive for individuals to restrain healthcare spending
while the MSA provides a vehicle for savings to help
pay for future medical needs.
This Forum meeting will examine how the FEHB
program works, what issues its managers face, and what
lessons it might hold for covering other populations.
William E. Flynn III, associate director for retirement
and insurance at OPM, will lead off with an overview
of the program and key issues facing its managers.
Walton Francis, a leading expert on the FEHB program, and Michael J. O’Grady, Ph.D., senior analyst
at the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, will
analyze important features of the program as well as
what lessons it may hold for outside populations.

Issue Questions
The questions to be addressed include the following:






THE FORUM SESSION
The FEHB program is constantly held up as an
example to emulate and sometimes seen as a place to
put populations needing health insurance. For example,
during last year’s debate over reforming Medicare, one
approach under consideration would have converted
Medicare to a defined contribution plan mimicking
many features of the FEHB program.15 More recent




On what basis do health plans compete within the
FEHB program?
Does the statutory requirement to have particular
plans compete in the program detract from the
government’s ability to contain the growth of costs?
How much leverage could OPM exert if it were
mandated to be more selective about which carriers
competed?
Given the contribution formula and other features of
the program, to what degree do plans compete to
attract healthier members and to what degree do
they compete on the basis of administrative efficiency and quality of care?
How are various players—individuals, health plans,
and taxpayers—affected by the risk segmentation
that has occurred in the program and to what degree?
Should the government consider implementing a
risk adjustment system for paying FEHB health
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plans? What other measures might be taken to
mitigate the effects of risk segmentation?

9. PPRC, 1997 Report to Congress, 181.

Should the benefit packages of plans competing in
the program be more standardized?

11. OPM, “Study of the Federal Employees Health Benefits
Program,” 72.

How would the introduction of catastrophic plans
coupled with medical savings accounts affect the
program?

12. OPM, “Study of the Federal Employees Health Benefits
Program,” 7.

How are low-wage federal workers impacted by the
FEHB contribution formula?

14. Statement of Joseph R. Antos, assistant director for health
and human resources, Congressional Budget Office, on
premium increases in the Federal Employees Health Benefits
Program, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on
Civil Service, October 8, 1997.

What issues arise when considering the FEHB
model for outside populations? Is it a feasible option
for covering the uninsured or other groups? If so, to
what degree would federal employees be segregated
from the new groups? Is OPM an appropriate
administrator for a program covering people outside
of federal employment?
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